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RETHINKING DRED SCOTT: NEW CONTEXT FOR AN OLD CASE
AUSTIN ALLEN*
INTRODUCTION
Almost everyone despises Dred Scott v. Sandford.1 Its holdings that
no African American, slave or free, could be a federal citizen and that Con-
gress possessed no authority to limit the expansion of slavery into the fed-
eral territories have provoked the ire of commentators for generations. An
overwhelming consensus exists among legal scholars that Dred Scott, for
one reason or another, was an appalling decision-one of the worst ever to
be handed down by the Supreme Court. At that point, the consensus ends,
and the reasons for the decision's failings multiply. Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall and Bruce Ackerman, for example, base their criticism on Dred
Scott's rejection of black citizenship, a holding that Marshall considers to
be tied to flaws in the original Constitution. 2 Justice Antonin Scalia and
* Assistant Professor of History, University of Houston-Downtown. A portion of this paper
was presented at the 2005 meeting of the Society for Historians of the Early American Republic (Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania). I would like to thank Jack Balkin, Paul Finkelman, and Sandy Levinson for
inviting me to participate in this symposium. Thanks as well to Paul Finkelman, Mark Graber, Calvin
Johnson, and Scot Powe for their comments during the discussion of this Paper.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that no black, free or slave, may be a federal citizen
for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction and that Congress possessed no authority to limit the expansion
of slavery into the Federal territories), superseded in part by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
I say "almost everyone" because tax protestors regularly (and unsuccessfully) invoke Dred
Scott as an authority exempting them from taxation. Tax protestors on the far Right embrace Dred Scott
and interpret its citizenship ruling to mean that there are several classes of citizens. Members of the
highest class--or "sovereigns"-live under no obligation to follow U.S. law, especially tax laws. See
Anderson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 89, 92 n.3 (1998) (rejecting the argument that "sover-
eigns" are exempt from taxation); Barcroft v. County of Fannin, 118 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App. 2003)
(rejecting Dred Scott as "a historical footnote in our jurisprudence" that is not a reliable authority); see
also Susan P. Koniak, The Chosen People in Our Wilderness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1761, 1773, 1779-80
(1997) (reviewing JAMES CORCORAN, GATHERING STORM: AMERICA'S MILITIA THREAT (1996) and
CATHERINE McNICOL STOCK, RURAL RADICALS: RIGHTEOUS RAGE IN THE AMERICAN GRAIN (1996))
(placing this use of Dred Scott in the context of Right-wing militia thought).
Such uses of Dred Scott do not limit themselves to Right-wing militia members; at least one
black nationalist organization has tried to make a similar case for exemption from federal law. See, e.g.,
Great Seal Moorish Sci. Temple of America, Inc. v. New Jersey, No. 05-CV-345, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21550, at *2 n.I (E.D. Pa. 2005).
2. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 ("We think they [black Americans) ... are not included, and were
not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution .... ); I BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 63 (1991) ("The very idea that the court could declare thatfree black
people were forever barred from American citizenship remains, after 130 years, an awful rebuke to our
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Robert H. Bork, who find the decision equally deplorable, base their criti-
cism on the ruling that the prohibition against slavery's expansion violated
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which they contend intro-
duced the illegitimate concept of substantive due process into constitutional
law.3 Cass R. Sunstein criticizes the Dred Scott Court not so much because
it decided issues incorrectly (although he would agree that it did), but rather
because it attempted to decide the issues at all, thus circumventing oppor-
tunities for a democratic resolution of questions into which it had inter-
vened.4 This list could become quite expansive, for Dred Scott was a
complicated case.
Dred Scott, moreover, evokes a number of important questions. Does
the decision's racism stand as the starting benchmark in American law's
march toward racial equality, 5 or does it underscore an endemic racism in
American culture that has not yet been adequately remedied? 6 Was Dred
Scott an example of judicial overreaching that illegitimately removed con-
flicts over fundamental values from the democratic process, 7 or was the
decision a legitimate exercise of judicial authority within a constitutionally
Constitution."); Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1987) (arguing that the Constitution's central flaw, ultimately
expressed in Dred Scott, "arose from the contradiction between guaranteeing liberty and justice to all,
and denying both to Negroes").
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450 ("[A]n act of Congress which deprives a
citizen.., of his... property, merely because he ... brought his property into a particular Terri-
tory.., could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law."); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Court "was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by Dred Scott," which "rested
upon the concept of 'substantive due process' that the Court praises and employs today"); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32 (1990) ("[O]nce it is
conceded that a judge may give the due process clause substantive content, Dred Scott, Lochner, and
Roe are equally valid examples of constitutional law.").
4. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Forward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REv. 4, 49 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Zappa v. Cruz, 30 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.P.R. 1998):
It would be folly to deny the chequered past this nation has with respect to the ill-treatment of
many minorities.... But our nation's conscience has evolved, and, based largely on the ef-
forts and courage of people like Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, and Thurgood Mar-
shall, the law no longer tolerates state-sanctioned discrimination based on racial or ethnic
classifications.
Id. at 128 (citations omitted, but citing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, among other decisions).
6. See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1923 (2000); David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the
Legacy of Slavery andJim Crow, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1375, 1403 (2004).
7. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 60-62 (Sanford Levinson
rev., 2d ed. 1994); Robert A. Burt, What Was Wrong with Dred Scott, What's Right about Brown, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1985); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 48-49.
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circumscribed democratic polity? 8 Does Dred Scott represent a precursor of
modem-day originalism,9 or is it the ancestor of decidedly nonoriginalist
rulings lo like Lochner v. New York l l and Roe v. Wade?12 Was Dred Scott
the result of political partisans capturing the Court,13 or was it the product
of a systemic failure in constitutional government? 14 Finally, does Dred
Scott point to a need for a departmental constitutionalism that provides
interpretive space to counter malevolent decisions, 15 or was the ruling
merely an aberration that does not compromise judicial supremacy? 16
These are difficult questions which legal scholars may not be fully
equipped to answer, because historians have not yet provided them with the
full context in which Dred Scott developed. Historical research has done an
admirable job reconstructing the political debates surrounding the decision
8. See AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1837-1857, at 139-40, 150-59, 179-82 (2006); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 322-34, 365-66 (1978);
Edward S. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17 AM. HIST.
REV. 52, 53-59 (1911).
9. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sandford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 11l HARV. L.
REV. 963, 976 n.47 (1998); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10
CONST. COMMENT. 37 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1050 (2004); Barry
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1998); Jamin
B. Raskin, Roe v. Wade and the Dred Scott Decision: Justice Scalia's Peculiar Analogy in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, I AM. U. J. GENDER& L. 61 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Causeway Med. Suite v. leyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1122-23
(5th Cir. 1997) (Garza, J., concurring) (arguing that Dred Scott was the doctrinal forbearer of Roe v.
Wade); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1405 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that Dred Scott provided the foundation for all subsequent substantive due process cases); BORK,
supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that Lochner and Roe followed logically from Dred Scott); William H.
Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 700-01 (1976)
(arguing that Dred Scott was a classic nineteenth-century example of the living constitution).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling that maximum-hours legislation violated the right of contract
purportedly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ruling that privacy rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
extended to abortion under certain circumstances).
13. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 3, 340, 363-64, 366, 391-93, 385-403; Paul
Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1996);
Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred
Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487 (2002).
14. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 6-7, 9-12, 69-73, 133-37, 220 (arguing that Dred Scott devel-
oped out of doctrinal conflicts and internal disputes not reducible to sectional politics); MARK A.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 17-18 (2006) (arguing that Dred
Scott was not the product of flawed constitutional interpretations but rather a consequence of constitu-
tional sanction of evil practices).
15. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83,
100 (1998); Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and Schauer, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 65 (1998).
16. Larry Alexander & Frederick Shauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382-83 (1997).
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and recovering some of the legal issues at stake, but it has not gone far
enough. Scholars know relatively little about what the members of the
Dred Scott Court thought they were doing in handing down their decision
and even less about the particular constraints that shaped the Justices' ac-
tions. Without more research into those issues, scholars will have only a
partial knowledge of the origins and significance of Dred Scott and, conse-
quently, may never develop satisfactory answers for the questions to which
the decision is relevant.
This Paper argues that scholars have misunderstood the Dred Scott
case by overlooking the doctrinal context in which it emerged. The argu-
ment that follows has three parts. Part I discusses the leading historical
accounts of the case, notably the one developed by Don E. Fehrenbacher. It
argues that Fehrenbacher's thesis, despite its considerable strengths, relied
too heavily on partisan accounts of the sectional crisis developed by ante-
bellum Republicans and on mid-twentieth-century legal theory. Fehren-
bacher's analysis, therefore, neglected the larger doctrinal context in which
Dred Scott developed. Part II presents an alternative account of Dred
Scott's origins and contends that Dred Scott emerged from a series of unin-
tended consequences resulting from the Taney Court's efforts to incorpo-
rate their Jacksonian vision of governance into constitutional law. The
argument here demonstrates how this effort shaped the Court's approach to
diversity jurisdiction as well as the Justices' debate over the place of slav-
ery and corporations in constitutional law. In 1857, those factors converged
in a manner that made a decision like Dred Scott inescapable. Part III dis-
cusses the implications that the analysis in Part II holds for constitutional
theory, specifically arguments dealing with the problem of judicial sover-
eignty. This Part argues that, because decisions like Dred Scott may be
unavoidable, theories hoping that judges will discipline themselves through
minimalist interpretation or adherence to a stark distinction between law
and politics are insufficient. Cases like Dred Scott demand a departmental
constitutionalism with ample room for extrajudicial interpretation to chal-
lenge malevolent Supreme Court decisions.
I. INTERPRETING DRED ScoTTIN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Among historians, the interpretive framework explaining Dred Scott
rests on the arguments developed in the 1970s by David M. Potter, 17 Wil-
17. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 267-96 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1976) (analyzing Dred Scott as part of a larger sectional struggle over values).
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liam M. Wiecek, 18 Paul Finkelman, 19 and especially Don E. Fehren-
bacher.20 These scholars portrayed Dred Scott as a political problem
emerging from the conflict over slavery's moral legitimacy that had
plagued the United States since its earliest days. 21 Although the American
Revolution had unleashed considerable antislavery sentiment, 22 a strong
Southern presence among federal officeholders, a rising tide of racism, and
a gradual waning of Revolutionary idealism ensured that the Constitution
received an interpretation favorable to slaveholding interests.23 By the early
nineteenth century, politicians and judges at the national level had reached
an understanding that issues relating to slavery and abolition belonged ex-
clusively to the states and that the federal government's responsibility in
the matter began and ended with the protection of slaveholders' property
rights.24 Recurring controversies over slavery's expansion into new territo-
ries and the rise of a radical and vocal abolitionist movement undermined
this understanding and placed Southern officials on the defensive. In the
three decades after 1830, these officials staked out increasingly proslavery
positions-perhaps to the point of nationalizing 25 the South's "peculiar
institution" 26-and by doing so, they antagonized and alienated many, and
ultimately most, of their Northern counterparts. These studies, although
grounded in careful analyses of nineteenth-century source material, raised
significant questions about the modern United States', and in particular its
courts', ability to manage political conflicts stemming from clashes be-
tween irreconcilable moral priorities. Indeed, both the strengths and weak-
nesses of these accounts arise from their ability to explain the origins of
18. William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-
1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978) (arguing that Dred Scott was the culmination of two decades of pro-
slavery rulings).
19. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981)
(placing Dred Scott in the context of a judicial civil war).
20. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8 (arguing that Dred Scott was both a partisan effort to write
Southern political positions into constitutional law and a major step toward judicial supremacy); see
also Don E. Fehrenbacher, Roger B. Taney and the Sectional Crisis, 43 J.S. HIST. 555 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis] (arguing that Taney was a sectional partisan).
21. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 18-19; FINKELMAN, supra note 19; POTTER, supra note 17,
at 41-50 (defining the sectional crisis as a conflict over values).
22. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 16-18; FINKELMAN, supra note 19; WILLIAM M. WIECEK,
THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 40-61 (1977); see
also ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH
169-72 (1967).
23. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 36-73.
24. WIECEK, supra note 22, at 15-16 (labeling this understanding "the federal consensus").
25. POTTER, supra note 17, at 351; Paul Finkelman, The Nationalization of Slavery: A Counter-
factualApproach to the 1860s, 14 LA. STUD. 213 (1975); Wiecek, supra note 18, at 54-57.
26. The phrase is Kenneth Stampp's. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).
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Dred Scott in the context of antebellum partisan struggle while explaining
its subsequent importance in the context of a modem conception of judicial
authority.
A. The Fehrenbacher Thesis
Of these studies, Fehrenbacher's book The Dred Scott Case stands
paramount. Since its publication, historians have accepted its central argu-
ments as the standard interpretation of the Court's 1857 decision.27 Fehren-
bacher placed Dred Scott firmly in the context of partisan struggle over the
slavery issue, and portrayed the Court's ruling as a last-ditch effort by a
panicked majority of Southern, Democratic Justices to write extreme pro-
slavery positions into federal law in order to ward off an increasingly pow-
erful Republican Party. Seizing an opportunity provided by a complex case,
Chief Justice Taney, with the support of four of his Southern colleagues
and two of his Northern ones, passed on every chance to evade a broad
ruling, declared free blacks to be noncitizens, and struck down a major
piece of legislation barring slavery's expansion into the federal territories.
The arguments sustaining these rulings, however, suffered from distorted
logic, fabricated history, unsound doctrine, and, because of their racism,
moral bankruptcy. These shortcomings manifested themselves, Fehren-
bacher argued, because Taney's opinion was nothing less than "a work of
unmitigated partisanship, '28 and the Court's intervention into the sectional
crisis was, at bottom, an "unusually bold venture in a desperate struggle for
power, rather than ... an evenhanded effort to resolve that struggle. '29
Here lay the continuing significance of Dred Scott, for, although most
of the issues that produced the case are long dead (with the question of race
being an obvious exception), the decision still remains one of the most
controversial exercises of judicial review in U.S. history. Fehrenbacher
wrote in the wake of the Warren Court's initiation of a "revolution ... in
27. Reviewers greeted The Dred Scott Case as a significant scholarly achievement and empha-
sized its indispensability to an understanding of the case. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, What Did the Dred
Scott Case Really Decide?, 7 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 369, 374 (1979) ("in short, this is history at its
finest."); Harold M. Hyman, Book Review, 45 J.S. HIST. 439, 441 (1979) (calling Fehrenbacher's book
"a history of a quality too rarely encountered"); Stanley I. Kutler, Book Review, 66 J. AM. HIST. 936,
937 (1980) ("What [Fehrenbacher] deserves most of all is to be read by all American historians."). In
subsequent years, the nearly uncritical acceptance of the book's central conclusions by the authors of
major historical syntheses has underscored that indispensability. See, e.g., JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 170-80 (1988); KENNETH M. STAMPP, AMERICA IN
1857: A NATION ON THE BRINK 83-109 (1990); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 708-15 (2005).




which the Supreme Court undertook to make public policy on a vast
scale" 30 and through which "judicial activism ... became the main channel
of social change."'31 Fehrenbacher's book gave readers who were sympa-
thetic to the results reached by the Warren Court reason to be wary of its
newly asserted authority: judicial sovereignty need not always produce
praiseworthy consequences like school desegregation or voter redistricting.
Post-Warren Courts have only confirmed Fehrenbacher's skepticism, 32 and
their continuing commitment to judicial sovereignty over the past three
decades has probably contributed to The Dred Scott Case's staying power
as much as anything else.
Fehrenbacher and the other members of his cohort developed a very
strong analysis of Dred Scott, one that accounted for a substantial majority
of the evidence then considered relevant. 33 The interpretation possessed so
much explanatory power that the broad outlines of the Fehrenbacher thesis
have thus far gone unchallenged. Yet, Fehrenbacher has not escaped criti-
cism. Paul Finkelman rejected his argument that the Constitution was es-
sentially an antislavery document. 34 Mark Graber pointed out that the
Court's use of judicial review may not have been as revolutionary as Fe-
hrenbacher, among many others, has assumed. For example, the Court had
quietly overturned federal legislation several times between Marbury and
Dred Scott.35 Political scientists and lawyers have contended that Taney's
citizenship ruling had a stronger legal footing than Fehrenbacher acknowl-
edged. 36 And numerous other scholars have explored aspects of the case
30. Id. at 594.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Forward: We the Court, 115
HARv. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's assumption of judicial sovereignty
represents a radical break with previous assertions of judicial supremacy). But see G. Edward White,
The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1465-70 (2003) (arguing that
the Court's assertions of judicial supremacy tend to be balanced out by the relatively narrow range of
issues over which it has a say).
33. One piece of evidence that Fehrenbacher noted but did not explain was the apparent contradic-
tion between the Court's refusal to allow African Americans access to diversity jurisdiction even
though it allowed corporations to maintain suits in diversity. See Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis, supra
note 20, at 562. Unraveling that contradiction opens up a new way of looking at the case. See infra text
accompanying notes 145-60.
34. Compare FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 19-27, with Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the
Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 188 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
35. Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 73, 107 (2000) ("The naked land transfer cases also demonstrate that judicial review of federal
law, understood as the judicial power to impose constitutional limits on federal practice, was relatively
common practice before the Civil War.").
36. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
212-71 (1997); GRABER, supra note 14, at 47-57; Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitu-
tional Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1087, 1106-07 (1993).
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that Fehrenbacher overlooked. 37 Few writers, however, have challenged
Fehrenbacher's central contentions that Dred Scott was primarily an ex-
pression of sectional politics 38 and an early exercise of judicial sover-
eignty. 3
9
B. The Limits of the Fehrenbacher Thesis
The issues of sectional politics and judicial sovereignty, however,
form the precise point at which Fehrenbacher's argument becomes prob-
lematic, because the assumptions embedded in his analysis obscure as
much as they explain. The concern here is not whether these assumptions
are incorrect-no one can seriously deny the importance of sectional poli-
tics or the relevance of debates about the nature of judicial authority.
Rather, the question centers on the way in which these assumptions influ-
enced perceptions of evidence and helped define what material was signifi-
cant. To his credit, Fehrenbacher stated his assumptions clearly:
37. See generally ALLEN, supra note 8 (arguing that Dred Scott emerged out internal struggles on
the Court); Austin Allen, The Political Economy of Blackness: Citizenship, Corporations, and Race in
Dred Scott, 50 Civ. WAR HIST. 229 (2004) [hereinafter Allen, Political Economy] (arguing that Dred
Scott's citizenship ruling emerged, in part, to remedy internal conflicts over corporations' ability to
access the federal courts); David Skillen Bogen, The Maryland Context of Dred Scott: The Decline in
the Legal Status of Maryland Free Blacks, 1776-1810,34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 381 (1990) (arguing that
the declining status of free blacks in Taney's home state influenced his citizenship ruling); Dennis K.
Boman, The Dred Scott Case Reconsidered: The Legal and Political Context in Missouri, 44 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 405 (2000) (arguing that the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling emerged as part of a com-
promise measure in conference); Eric T. Dean, Jr., Reassessing Dred Scott: The Possibilities of Federal
Power in the Antebellum Context, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 713 (1992) (arguing that scholars have misunder-
stood the doctrinal context in which Dred Scott emerged); Stanton D. Krauss, New Evidence That Dred
Scott Was Wrong About Whether Free Blacks Could Count for the Purposes of Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 37 CONN. L. REV. 25 (2004) (arguing exactly what the title says); Magliocca, supra note
13 (arguing that Dred Scott was an example of a recurrent pattern in which the Supreme Court uses
political rulings to strike down rising political movements that challenge the established political order);
Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law
of Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995 (1996) (arguing that comity principles rather than antislavery
motivated Justice Curtis in his dissent in Dred Scott); Stuart A. Streichler, Justice Curtis's Dissent in
the Dred Scott Case: An Interpretive Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509 (1997) (arguing that Justice
Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott contained more nuance than previous scholars have acknowledged); Lea
VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033 (1997) (arguing that
Harriet Scott possessed a superior legal case compared to that of her husband but that a legal system
structured around male privilege suppressed her story); John S. Vishneski III, What the Court Decided
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 373 (1988) (arguing that the procedures followed by
the Court in the writing of opinions ensured that all elements of Taney's opinion constituted the opinion
of the Court).
38. But see Allen, Political Economy, supra note 37 (arguing that Dred Scott emerged as a conse-
quence of internal struggles on the Court).
39. But see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 418-31 (1998) (arguing that contemporary critics
of Dred Scott did not view its shortcomings in the same terms as late-twentieth-century lawyers).
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[A]lthough the Dred Scott decision was essentially a vain effort to turn
back the clock of civilization and permanently legitimate a "relic of
barbarism," in at least one respect it had a distinctly modern ring.
American courts in the late twentieth century are no longer mere
constitutional censors of public policies fashioned by other hands. They
have also become initiators of social change. Government by judiciary is
now, in a sense, democracy's non-democratic alternative to
representative government when the latter bogs down in failure or
inaction .... The [Dred Scott] decision, in fact, provided an early
indication of the vast judicial power that could be generated if political
issues were converted by definition into constitutional questions. 40
In this passage, Fehrenbacher linked antebellum politics to modem
concerns about judicial review, but in doing so, he introduced two prob-
lems. First, his reference to the "relic of barbarism" (a Republican euphe-
mism for the evils of slavery and polygamy) underscored his debt to the
powerful, but partial, narratives of sectional conflict developed by partisans
in the 1850s. Second, his connection of Dred Scott to recent concerns about
"government by judiciary" joined a largely ahistorical debate that gives
short shrift to the context in which the case emerged. Together, these two
assumptions led Fehrenbacher to overlook important bodies of evidence
that could have led to a much different account of the decision.
Although he criticized Taney for adopting a pro-Southern interpreta-
tion of the sectional crisis, 4 1 Fehrenbacher himself proved quite partial to
the account of events put forth by Republicans, who like Southern parti-
sans, were deeply interested in the outcome of the conflict. Few current
historians would question that Republicans' moral objections to slavery
were legitimate, but their arguments against the institution and the Democ-
ratic Party, which so staunchly supported it, remained tightly linked to the
electoral realities of the late antebellum North. In the 1850s, Republicans
faced an uncertain political environment in which a number of organiza-
tions competed to become the Democrats' major opposition. New waves of
immigration had left the Northern electorate deeply divided along ethnic
lines, and the Republicans thus developed arguments designed to outma-
neuver the nativist Know-Nothing (or American) Party. Republicans both
downplayed ethnic divisions by emphasizing a domineering slaveocracy as
a common threat to the North,42 and accommodated them by distancing
40. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
41. Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis, supra note 20 (providing the most concise statement of this
criticism).
42. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 226-60 (1970).
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their movement from Catholic immigrants rather than all immigrants. 43 In
this fashion, Republicans alienated only Southerners, whom they did not
need if they could secure a majority of Northern voters, and the Irish, who
would most likely vote for Democrats anyway. 44
Republicans also attracted alienated Democrats who were bolting their
party over its unrelenting concessions to proslavery expansion. They did so
by relegating abolitionists, along with calls for racial equality, to the mar-
gins of their movement 45 and by adopting arguments developed by disaf-
fected Democrats that the Union had come under the control of a slave
power conspiracy.46 For Republicans, therefore, all of the major political
events of the 1850s required an explanation centered on the Democratic
Party's effort to expand slavery at all costs and at every turn. When the
Court handed down Dred Scott, Republicans merely interpreted it in the
light of their developing narrative. 47 Because they would rather not defend
against charges that they were enemies of law and order, they shied away
from substantive analysis of the case in favor of arguments over whether
the Court should have decided it in the first place and whether its major
assertions constituted dictum.48 The net effect of this strategy was that Re-
publicans had little inclination to explain Dred Scott in any other terms
besides those of sectional conflict. Fehrenbacher, although he devoted more
attention to the decision's substantive arguments than any historian before
him, did not break with this tradition, and his account, at bottom, repre-
sented an updated version of the Republicans' point of view.
Fehrenbacher's interest in the debates surrounding judicial sover-
eignty, ironically perhaps, also discouraged an exploration of the specific
context in which Dred Scott emerged. The questions constitutional theorists
ask in these debates are significant: Is judicial review legitimate? If so, then
how does one reconcile this countermajoritarian practice with American
democratic traditions? What sort of issues are appropriate for judicial reso-
lution? Is the Supreme Court the final arbiter of constitutional meaning? If
not, then where does one draw the line between the interpretive authority of
the various branches of government, and how does one resolve conflicts
43. See William E. Gienapp, Nativism and the Creation of a Republican Majority in the North
Before the Civil War, 72 J. AM. HIST. 529 (1985).
44. See, e.g., NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHrTE 148-76 (1995) (discussing the
relationship between Irish immigrants and the Democratic Party).
45. James Brewer Stewart, Reconsidering the Abolitionists in an Age of Fundamentalist Politics,
26 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 1, 21-22 (2006).
46. See JONATHAN H. EARLE, JACKSONIAN ANTISLAVERY AND THE POLITICS OF FREE SOIL,
1824-1854 (2004) (providing the best account to date of the Democratic side of antislavery).
47. See POTTER, supra note 17, at 287-90.
48. Id. at 283-86.
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among these branches? The problem for historians in these debates stems
from constitutional theory's (general) insensitivity to historical context.
49
Legal scholars see little problem setting Dred Scott next to a case like
Brown v. Board of Education50 and discussing how the Court behaved cor-
rectly in the latter and wrongly in the former.51 This juxtaposition surely
has its merits, but it tends to take both decisions out of context by failing to
take into account the radically different sets of constraints that the Taney
Court faced compared to that of the Post-New Deal Warren Court. The
trouble for historians dealing with modem constitutional theory-which,
one must admit, is enticing-comes from the tendency to read twentieth-
century assumptions concerning judicial power back into the nineteenth
century.
Fehrenbacher's analysis of Dred Scott's long-term significance fell
prey to this error. His discussion of the decision's relationship to emerging
notions ofjudicial sovereignty rested on an implicit plotline that began with
Hayburn's Case,52 continued through a relative handful of antebellum
cases ending with Dred Scott, and then finished with the major rulings of
the Warren Court.53 But, there is a bit of an analytical leap on this last step.
The body of scholarship from which Fehrenbacher derived this plotline was
produced by scholars interested primarily in post-Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, which, eventually but radically, transformed the nature of
constitutional law and involved issues of which the Taney Court could not
have been cognizant and uses of judicial authority with which the Court
would not have been familiar.54 Certainly, the rise of judicial sovereignty
was (and still is) an important issue, but the story really does not offer
49. This is a sweeping generalization. There are some very historically astute lawyers doing great
work. Bruce Ackerman, G. Edward White, and Barry Friedman leap to mind.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated educational institutions were inherently
unequal).
51. See, e.g., Ralph F. Bischoff, One Hundred Years of Court Decisions: Dred Scott After a
Century, 6 J. PuB. L. 411 (1957); Burt, supra note 7.
52. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (refusing to carry out duties not judicial in nature).
53. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 209-35, 593-95.
54. Fehrenbacher, for example, relied heavily on the work of Charles Grove Haines, who sought
to explain the emergence of an aggressive judiciary in the second half of the nineteenth century and
who linked this development to the Fourteenth Amendment. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 23 (2d ed., 1959). Fehrenbacher also drew upon works
debating the legitimacy of judicial review in the wake of the New Deal and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 34-55 (1960) (arguing, on philosophical rather than historical grounds, that
the legitimacy of the constitutional system rests on judicial review); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 29-31 (1962) (arguing,
again on philosophical grounds, that judicial review cannot, by itself, serve a legitimating function).
Each of these works, especially the latter two, rest on assumptions about the role of the judiciary that
would have been alien to the members of the Taney Court.
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much insight into what the members of the Taney Court thought they were
doing or how they understood the limits and reach of their authority.
Answers to those questions lay not in the relationship among the rela-
tively small number of great cases that make up what J.M. Balkin and San-
ford Levinson term the constitutional canon,55 but rather in the hundreds
(for the Taney Court) of minor cases that the Justices heard day in and day
out that shaped their perceptions of the issues, defined their disagreements,
and created the context in which important cases emerged. Fehrenbacher's
interpretive model, however, discouraged an exploration of these issues.
His reliance on the Republicans' narrative of events kept him relentlessly
focused on the sectional crisis, which they rightly considered important, at
the expense of other issues that may well have been relevant. Additionally
his adherence to mid-twentieth-century constitutional theory provided a
framework that defined Dred Scott's relationship to other major cases for
him. From such a perspective, no benefit could arise from delving deeply
into a pile of largely inconsequential Supreme Court rulings. Any account
of Dred Scott that does not do so, however, fails to provide a fully contex-
tualized analysis of the decision.
II. RECONTEXTUALIZING DRED ScoTT
Neither modem constitutional theory nor antebellum Republicans of-
fer satisfactory explanations of the origins and significance of Dred Scott.
A properly contextualized understanding of the decision must begin with a
reappraisal of the Taney Court, which scholars have generally depicted in
two ways. One group of studies presents the Court as an institution that
practiced judicial self-restraint and promoted capitalist economic develop-
ment. These accounts focus on cases like Luther v. Borden56 in which the
Court deferred to other branches when confronted with a "political ques-
tion" and Charles River Bridge,57 which allowed states to create competing
franchises even if that competition would effectively destroy older corpora-
tions. From this perspective, Dred Scott appears as a regrettable aberra-
tion. 58 The other branch of studies places Dred Scott at the center of Taney
Court jurisprudence. These accounts portray the Court as an unrestrained
55. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 963.
56. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (refusing to determine which of two competing Rhode Island
constitutions was legitimate).
57. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420 (1837).
58. See, e.g., MCCLOSKEY, supra note 7, at 63 (arguing that the Court in Dred Scott squandered
an image of judicial self-restraint that it had spent decades building); see also Wiecek, supra note 18, at
34-35 (discussing other examples of this trend and providing citations).
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defender of slavery. Cases like Prigg v. Pennsylvania,59 which upheld the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793,60 and Groves v. Slaughter61 in which the Jus-
tices stated firmly, but gratuitously, that slavery represented a matter of
exclusive local control, exemplified this tendency.
62
Elements of both approaches contain merit, but scholars have tended
to pursue only one of these lines of inquiry at a time. Thus, Felix Frank-
furter63 and Stanley Kutler 64 have produced informative studies on the
economic side of the Court's activity, while Fehrenbacher 65 and Finkel-
man 66 have dug deeply into the Court's relationship to slavery. A number
of writers--Carl Brent Swisher,67 Harold Hyman,
68 William Wiecek,69
and, most recently, Timothy Huebner 7O-have insisted that understanding
the Taney Court requires analysis of both aspects of its work. Even so,
these accounts likewise maintain the partition between the two subjects,
and scholars have not yet explored the way in which the Court perceived
connections between slavery and economic development. 71 That oversight
is unfortunate, for Dred Scott emerged precisely where these two issues
intersected in the Court's larger jurisprudential framework.
72
59. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
60. Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, ch. 7, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05.
61. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841) (holding a contract for the slaves in Mississippi to be valid
despite a state constitutional provision to the contrary).
62. Id. at 503-17 (Taney, C.J., McLean, & Baldwin, JJ., concurring separately) (Story, Thompson,
Wayne, & McKinley, JJ., concurring in part) (showing every member of the Court to be signed on to
this position, in one form or another, despite the silence of the official opinion on the subject); see also
Wiecek, supra note 18, at 51-53.
63. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
(1937).
64. STANLEY 1. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE
CASE (1971).
65. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8.
66. FINKELMAN, supra note 19; Paul Finkelman, "Hooted Down the Page of History ": Reconsid-
ering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney, 1994 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 83; Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on
the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 247.
67. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-1864 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974).
68. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875 (1982).
69. Id.; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE
56-81 (1988).
70. TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE TANEY COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY (2003).
71. 1 have argued elsewhere that this problem afflicts American legal history generally. Allen,
Political Economy, supra note 37, at 259-60.
72. The interpretation of Dred Scott put forth in this section represents a skeletal sketch of the
argument presented in my new book, Origins of the Dred Scott Case. Readers in search of more evi-
dence to support the positions advanced here should consult that work.
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A. The Parameters of Taney Court Jurisprudence
The Taney Court was, in some ways, the product of the cross-class
and cross-sectional political movement that generated the Democratic
Party. By the early 1840s, seven of the Court's nine members owed their
positions, in part, to their loyalty to either President Andrew Jackson or his
successor and protrg6 Martin Van Buren, and the Justices' participation in
the defining debates of the 1820s and 1830s decisively shaped the Court's
jurisprudence. 73 Antebellum Democrats considered their alliance to be a
movement of "the people" (that is, white males without elite pretension)
against the would-be aristocrats represented by the Whigs.74 Members of
the Taney Court participated in this movement by insisting that the people,
both collectively and individually, behave as sovereigns and govern them-
selves.
Although they never rejected the federal government's supremacy
within its sphere75 (or the incident power of review 76), the Justices worked
diligently to maximize the people's ability to rule themselves through their
legislatures. This agenda manifested itself in public law through the quali-
fication of particular Marshall Court precedents, 77 an adherence to the strict
construction of statutory and constitutional language, 78 and a refusal to
73. See HUEBNER, supra note 70, at 32-42, 51-80.
74. See JOHN ASHWORTH, "AGRARIANS" & "ARISTOCRATS": PARTY POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1837-1846, at 73-86 (1983); 1 JOHN ASHWORTH, SLAVERY, CAPITALISM, AND
POLITICS IN THE ANTEBELLUM REPUBLIC: COMMERCE AND COMPROMISE, 1820-1850, at 289-302
(1995); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA 1815-1846, at 119-22
(1991); see also Daniel Feller, A Brother in Arms: Benjamin Tappan and the Antislavery Democracy,
88 J. AM. HIST. 48 (2001) (arguing that antislavery Democrats swallowed their objections to the institu-
tion in a common, cross-sectional struggle against aristocracy).
75. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Comm'rs of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842) (holding on
grounds of federal supremacy that states may not tax the salaries of federal officials), enforcing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding on grounds of federal supremacy that
a state may not tax the Bank of the U.S.).
76. See Graber, supra note 35 (providing the best account of the antebellum Court's use of judicial
review).
77. Compare, e.g., Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 544-48 (1837) (holding that corporate charters must be interpreted strictly against
the grantees), with Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650-54 (1819)
(holding that legislative alterations of private corporate charters violate the Obligation of Contracts
clause). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall... pass any. .. Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... ).
78. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857) (arguing that the Consti-
tution spoke in 1857 "in the same words... with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke
when it came from the hands of its framers .... "); United States v. Briggs, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 351,354-
55 (1850) (upholding a conviction for the removal of trees from public land on grounds that the enact-
ing clause of the relevant statute applied to all trees rather the limited types stated in the act's title),
enforcing Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 66, § 1, 4 Stat. 472, 472 (captioned "An Act to provide for the
punishment of offences committed in cutting, destroying, or removing live oak and other timber or trees
reserved for naval purposes").
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extrapolate legislative intent from textual silences or ambiguities. 79 In so
doing, the Justices limited the reach of constitutional barriers on state
power that they believed their predecessors had imposed too stringently.
Strict construction, moreover, ensured that the Court would follow legisla-
tively and constitutionally expressed popular will to the letter, even if that
stance occasionally produced unintended consequences. 80 And the Justices'
unwillingness to extrapolate meaning from ambiguous texts underscored
their sense that such interpretive strategies would be law-making activities
that usurped legislative authority. 81 These elements came together to form
an essentially amoral public law framework in which the Court deferred to
legislatures on all questions concerning what Chief Justice Taney described
as the "expediency and moral tendency" of statutory law. 82
In its private law cases, however, the Court pursued a starkly different
strategy designed to force individual litigants to uphold their commercial
obligations. Just as the Justices' deferential stance toward legislatures
sought to make the people govern themselves collectively (by stating their
intentions clearly in statutory language), the Court's coercion of the liti-
gants before it demanded that individuals govern themselves, their affairs,
and their subordinates in a way suited to a member of the sovereignty.
Taney Court Justices applied common law doctrines in a strict, rule-
oriented fashion that compelled unsuccessful litigants to maintain commit-
ments that had become burdensome, 83 or even destructive, 84 and the
Courts' members exhibited little patience for parties that failed to exercise
their rights until the last minute.85 The Court's regime of self-government
79. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 594 (1839) (Taney, C.J.) (refusing to
declare whether Alabama's explicit policy of limiting the number of banks chartered within the state
also barred the operation of out-of-state banks).
80. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856) (holding that an Ohio constitutional
provision altering the tax rates for banking corporations violated the Obligation of Contracts Clause);
ALLEN, supra note 8, at 109-14 (discussing the unintended, and pro-corporation, consequences of the
Taney Court's Obligation of Contracts Clause decisions).
81. See Bank ofAugusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 594 ("It would hardly be respectful to a state for this
Court to forestall its decision, and to say, in advance of her legislation, what her interest or policy
demands. Such a course would savour more of legislation than of judicial interpretation.").
82. Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178, 198 (1840); see also ALLEN, supra note
8, at 13-30, 98-115 (providing a more elaborate discussion of and documentation for the summary in
the text accompanying supra notes 18-27).
83. See, e.g., Baker v. Nachtrieb, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 126 (1856) (upholding a contract conveying
all possessions to a religious community); Goesele v. Bimeler, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 589 (1853) (uphold-
ing a different contract conveying all possessions to a religious community).
84. See Bodley v. Goodrich, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 276 (1849) (rejecting a land claim necessary to a
company's survival, because it had not secured the consent of all of its creditors).
85. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Kennedy, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 210 (1850) (rejecting a creditor's claim to a
debt, because he and the administrators of his estate waited over forty years to collect and showed no
due diligence in the meantime).
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also imposed responsibility for the actions of employees upon the litigants
that came before the bench. Thus, the Court required merchants to pay for
the errors made by their clerks86 and held railroad companies to be negli-
gent when they employed drivers that would not follow instructions. 87 In
these cases, the Justices adhered to a market-oriented morality and used
legal rules instrumentally to achieve their policy goals-an approach that
ran counter to the amoral stance and refusal to extrapolate policy that
characterized their public law rulings.
These two positions, however, never came into conflict because Swift
v. Tyson88 functioned as a partition between them. Swift, as legal scholars
well know, created a federal common law of commerce that assumed con-
siderable importance after the Civil War.89 But what Swift ultimately be-
came is of no concern here, for the decision's significance for the Taney
Court lay in its assertion that, under the Judiciary Act of 1789,90 judicial
decisions did not constitute law. 91 "They are, at most," wrote Justice Jo-
seph Story, "only evidence of what the laws are; and are not of themselves
laws."'92 One cannot understate the importance of this formulation to Jus-
tice Story's colleagues, because a different definition would raise ideologi-
cal difficulties. As I have written elsewhere, "[t]reating court rulings as law
in effect endowed courts with a legislative authority and conferred on
judges the elite role of guiding and ruling the social order, '93 a role that the
Taney Court had flatly repudiated. Placing judicial decisions outside the
definition of law, however, permitted courts to "reexamine[], reverse[], and
qualifly]" 94 decisions as the need arose, and that definition thus permitted
the Taney Court to pursue aggressively a policy-oriented common law
agenda while simultaneously presenting itself as an institution that merely
applied, and certainly did not make, law. Over the next decade and a half,
86. See Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (8 Pet.) 263, 266-67 (1839).
87. See Phila. & Reading R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 487 (1853).
88. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that a preexisting debt constituted valid consideration to
make one a bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument).
89. See 1 TONY ALLAN FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 110-12, 119 n.60 (1979); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 59-86
(1992).
90. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 ("That the laws of the several states, except
where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases
where they apply.").
91. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
92. Id.
93. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 59.
94. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
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the Swift doctrine transformed the Court's practice in diversity jurisdic-
tion-the area in which the vast majority of its common law cases arose-
as the Justices steadily expanded the doctrine's reach. Indeed, by the mid-
1850s, the Court had stated firmly that it was not bound, in cases of diverse
citizenship, to follow state decisions with which it disagreed.95 That stance
carried momentous implications when lawyers for the family of Dred and
Harriet Scott sought to exploit it for the advantage of their clients.
96
B. Slavery, Corporations, and the Taney Court
The importance of the Scott family's litigation strategy becomes clear
in the context of the Taney Court's internal debates concerning the place of
slavery and corporations within its members' understanding of constitu-
tional law. In principle, the Justices considered slavery to be a matter of
exclusively local control. As Chief Justice Taney stated in his concurring
opinion in Groves v. Slaughter, "[T]he action of the several states upon this
subject, cannot be controlled by Congress, either by virtue of its power to
regulate commerce, or by virtue of any other power conferred by the Con-
stitution of the United States."'97 His opinion, at least as it extended to the
Commerce Clause, 98 featured the explicit assent of four of his seven then-
sitting colleagues, including the author of the majority opinion.99 The other
two Justices agreed as well, although their reasoning differed starkly both
from Chief Justice Taney and from each other.' 00 In practice, the issue
proved far more complicated, since the Constitution's Fugitive Slave
Clause ensured that slavery was, to some extent, a national issue. 101 Court
members, moreover, faced serious difficulties determining the precise
boundaries between federal commerce power and state police power, and
95. See, e.g., Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595 (1856) (refusing to follow the Michigan
Supreme Court's construction of a state statute because it broke with what the U.S. Supreme Court
considered to be settled interpretation).
96. See Dean, supra note 37; see also VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 37, at 1060-78
(emphasizing, among other things, that Dred Scott's struggle for freedom represented part of a family's
struggle for freedom).
97. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 How.) 449, 508 (1841).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
99. See Groves, 40 U.S. (15 How.) at 510 (Story, Thompson, Wayne, & McKinley, JJ., concur-
ring).
100. See id. at 503-08 (McLean, J., concurring) (taking an antislavery position); id. at 510-17
(Baldwin, J., concurring) (taking an extreme proslavery position).
101. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, reads,
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into an-
other, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Ser-
vice or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.
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the insertion of questions involving slavery only made the issue more diffi-
cult.
During the 1840s, the Justices split into two shifting coalitions as they
struggled with federal power over fugitive slaves in Prigg and the extent of
federal commerce power in the License Cases102 and the Passenger
Cases.103 A minority of Justices, with Chief Justice Taney in the lead, as-
serted that in all instances involving slavery, an inherent state power of
self-preservation trumped any federal constitutional provision. 104 The Jus-
tices in the majority, led initially by Justice Story and later by Justice John
McLean, flatly rejected that argument. So in Prigg, the Court held that
federal power over fugitive slaves was exclusive and that the states could
legitimately neither weaken nor strengthen federal fugitive slave laws. 105
Likewise, in the Passenger Cases, the Court ruled, in a rather chaotic fash-
ion, 106 that states possessed no authority to limit the influx of healthy im-
migrants into their jurisdictions, 107 a position that Taney believed
prevented slave states from preserving their social institutions by barring
the entry of migrant free blacks. 108
These debates, by the later 1840s, had become decidedly unproduc-
tive; the Court had become deeply fragmented, and the Justices were writ-
ing increasingly abstract opinions to distinguish themselves even from
those colleagues with whom they agreed. 109 In the 1850s, the Court worked
out a compromise that ended the debate among a majority of its mem-
bers." l 0 Their arguments over the extent of the Commerce Clause ended
when the Justices agreed to handle the issue on a case-by-case basis rather
than through broad statements of principle," i and Strader v. Graham"12
102. Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (holding that
state licensing laws designed to bar the sale of alcohol were valid exercises of the police power).
103. Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (holding that state taxes
levied on healthy immigrants violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause).
104. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 80-81.
105. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-18 (1842).
106. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 283 ("Inasmuch as there was no opinion of the court, as a court, the
reporter refers the reader to the opinions of the judges for an explanation of the statutes and the points in
which they conflicted with the Constitution and laws of the United States.").
107. See 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283.
108. See id. at 466-68 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
109. In the License Cases, for example, every justice agreed on the result (limiting the sale of
alcohol fell within the purview of state police power), but six justices wrote a total of nine separate
opinions-Catron wrote two, and McLean wrote three. See 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 505 (1847).
110. The two exceptions were Justices McLean and Daniel. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 32-33, 94.
111. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (7 How.) 299 (1852) (holding that, barring a federal
statute to the contrary, state piloting laws did not violate the Commerce Clause); ALLEN, supra note 8,
at 26-27, 94-95 (placing Cooley in the context of the Court's larger debates over slavery and the Com-
merce Clause).
112. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
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briefly put to rest disputes over slavery. Strader, which held that questions
concerning the possible freedom of enslaved persons engaged in interstate
transit fell outside of federal jurisdiction, 1 3 allowed Chief Justice Taney to
reassert a modified version of the argument he made in Groves. "Every
State," he wrote, "has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domes-
tic and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its terri-
tory .... "114 At this point, his position seemed identical to the one his
colleagues had rejected throughout the 1840s, but he then qualified his
statement in a manner that took into account his colleagues' reservations:
"except in so far as the powers of the States in this respect are restrained, or
duties and obligations imposed upon them, by the Constitution of the
United States." 115 With this argument, Chief Justice Taney admitted the
restrictions on state power recognized in Prigg and the Passenger Cases,
placed himself squarely in the Court's majority, and, for the first time,
managed to speak for the Court in a slavery case.1 16 His strategy effectively
forced all but a small number of questions involving slavery into state
courts, 117 and the maneuver would transform the way in which the Court
debated the issue in the future.
Between Strader and DredScott, the Justices discussed their concerns
about slavery in the context of corporate law, especially in a dispute about
corporations' access to diversity jurisdiction. This debate emerged in part
because the strategy announced in Strader applied most clearly to cases
coming out of state courts--over which the Judiciary Act of 1789 had con-
ferred a relatively narrow scope of review. 118 Whether the decision applied
113. Id. at 96-97.
114. Id. at 93.
115. Id.
116. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 92-93. Antislavery critics argued that this passage indicated a move
toward the nationalization of slavery. See JAMES G. BIRNEY, EXAMINATION OF THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CASE OF STRADER, GORMAN AND ARMSTRONG VS.
CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, DELIVERED AT ITS DECEMBER TERM, 1850, at 42 (1852). A number of impor-
tant historians have been sympathetic to this argument. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 260-62;
FINKELMAN, supra note 19, at 271-74; Wiecek, supra note 18, at 53-54.
117. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 93.
118. Here are the highlights:
[A] final judgment.., in the highest court... of a State .... where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the de-
cision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an
authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitu-
tion, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity,
or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty,
or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of
the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or af-
firmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error .... But no other error
shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such
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to cases initiated in the federal courts, where the Supreme Court possessed
much more flexibility both by statute 1l9 and under Swfi,120 remained an
open question. Unintended consequences arising from the Court's Obliga-
tion of Contracts doctrine, which served as the Justices' primary tool for
regulating corporations, also fueled this debate.
One of the Taney Court's first actions when it came together in 1837
was to reduce the amount of protection the Marshall Court had extended to
corporations whose charters represented contracts that, under the limita-
tions on state power listed in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, lay
beyond the reach of legislative authority.121 Chief Justice Taney and most
of his colleagues, both concerned about the implications of this policy for
economic development 22 and worried that unchecked corporate power
could serve as a foundation for would-be aristocrats, 123 reacted against the
Marshall Court formulation in Charles River Bridge. 124 Although it would
continue to recognize corporate charters' entitlement to protection under
the Obligation of Contracts Clause, the Court would strictly construe their
language and permit no privilege, even a reasonable one, to "pass[] by im-
plication."' 125 Such a policy fell squarely within the larger pattern of Taney
Court jurisprudence, for just as they did in statutory law, its members re-
fused to extrapolate legislative intent from ambiguous wording and textual
silences. If state legislatures wished corporations to have a certain privi-
lege, then the Court demanded that the legislatures grant it in explicit
terms. And they did.
In the process, state legislatures created a completely different set of
problems for the Court. Ohio, for example, pursued a policy in the 1840s
that stimulated its banking industry by granting charters featuring low and
as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions
of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authori-
ties in dispute.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (footnotes omitted).
119. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84-85 (limiting entitlement to writs of error only by establishing minimums
for amounts in dispute and setting time periods in which the writ must be brought).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 88-96.
121. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); ALLEN, supra note
8, at 100-03 (discussing the origins and significance of Dartmouth).
122. This is, of course, the standard interpretation of Charles River Bridge. See MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 130-39 (1977); KUTLER, supra
note 64, at 3-5.
123. This is my reading of the case. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 103.
124. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (II Pet.)
420 (1837) (rejecting a toll bridge company's reasonable argument that its charter implicitly precluded
the construction by a competing firm of a contiguous, and ultimately toll-free, bridge).
125. Id. at 546.
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unalterable tax rates.126 A few years later, the state changed its policy by
statute and then by constitutional provision. 127 Neither strategy worked. A
fragmented and unenthusiastic Taney Court majority struck down Ohio's
new policy, declaring it to be a violation of the Obligation of Contracts
Clause. 128 The Court's action mortified three of its Southern members-
Justices John A. Campbell, the newest member and a recent advocate of
secession; 129 Peter V. Daniel, the Court's most doctrinaire states'-rights
theorist; 130 and John Catron, a member of the nationalist coalition in the
debates of the 1840s and the most moderate of the three Southerners. 131
These Justices formed a faction outwardly committed to repudiating the
Court's Obligation of Contracts doctrine because of the doctrine's support
for quasi-aristocratic corporate power and insensitivity toward state rights.
In his dissent in Dodge v. Woolsey,132 which dealt with the Ohio constitu-
tional provision, Justice Campbell stressed that the Court had inserted itself
"between these corporations and the government and people of Ohio, to
which they owe their existence .... 1133 His colleagues' actions did nothing
but empower a "caste" of elites to look "habitually" past the states toward
the federal government, which would "maintain them in the enjoyment of
their special privileges and exemptions."' 134 Justice Daniel wrote in another
Ohio case 35 that the Court's Obligation of Contracts rulings constituted a
"suicidal doctrine."' 136 In the same case, Catron dismissed Charles River
Bridge's handling of constitutionally protected corporate charters as "illu-
sory and nearly useless,"']37 and he, along with Daniel, 138 called for a com-
126. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 111.
127. OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (adopted in 1851); see also STEPHEN E. MAIZLISH, THE TRIUMPH
OF SECTIONALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF OHIO POLITICS, 1844-1856, at 40-52, 163-65 (1983)
(discussing the politics at play in Ohio).
128. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856) (voiding the constitutional provision);
Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854) (striking down the
statute).
129. See JOHN A. CAMPBELL, THE RIGHTS OF THE SLAVE STATES 43-44 (1851) (advocating seces-
sion); see also HUEBNER, supra note 70, at 91-96 (providing a brief biography of Justice Campbell).
130. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 33 (discussing Justice Daniel's role on the Court); HUEBNER,
supra note 70, at 75-80 (providing a brief biography of Justice Daniel).
131. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 84-94 (discussing Catron's maneuvers in the debates of the
1840s); HUEBNER, supra note 70, at 66-72 (providing a brief biography of Justice Catron).
132. Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 362 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 373.
134. Id.
135. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1854) (rejecting contractual
status for the grant at issue).
136. Id. at 443 (Daniel, J.) ("I never can believe in that ... suicidal doctrine, which confers upon
one legislature, the... limited agents of the sovereign people, the power.., to bind forever and irrevo-
cably their creator ... to consequences however mischievous or destructive.").
137. Id. at 442 (Catron, J.).
138. Id. at 443 (Daniel, J.).
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plete repudiation of the Court's corporate law doctrine. 139 A majority of
Justices held together against these criticisms, but they remained frag-
mented-at one point so heavily that no Justice could speak for the
Court. 1
4 0
These divisions cut so deeply because the Ohio cases on their face
dealt with very serious issues. Repudiating state laws and especially consti-
tutional provisions was no trivial matter. But the Southern faction repeat-
edly raised another concern: the corporations, specifically the one in
Dodge, had used diversity jurisdiction to access the federal courts, which
then unforgivingly applied the Obligation of Contracts Clause against the
State. 14 1 The Supreme Court had allowed such access since 1844, when it
ruled that the act of granting a corporate charter effectively created a state
citizen. 142 Under the Constitution, such citizens possessed the right to sue
in diversity. 143 Nearly ten years passed before any Justice raised an objec-
tion. In 1853, however, Justice Daniel asserted, in a dissent, that corpora-
tions, because they were artificial persons, could not be citizens and
therefore could not maintain a suit in diversity. 144 A year later, both Jus-
tices Catron 45 and Campbell1 46 expressed their opposition. Again, the
majority held together, defending its position on grounds of stare de-
cisis.
14 7
The response left the members of the Southern faction dissatisfied,
most likely because their concerns extended to the possible analogies liti-
gants could draw from corporate citizenship. Although its members never
139. Id. at 442 (Catron, J.).
140. Id. at 416 (reporter's notes) ("There being no opinion of the court, as such, in this case, the
reporter can only state the laws of Ohio which were drawn into question.").
141. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 117.
142. Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844) ("[A]
corporation created.., in a particular state, is... a person, although an artificial person,.. . capable of
being treated as a citizen of that state .... ").
143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend.., to Controver-
sies ... between Citizens of different States .... ").
144. Rundle v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 100-01 (1853) (Daniel, J., dissent-
ing).
145. See N. Ind. R.R. v. Mich. Cent. R.R., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 233, 249 (1854) (Catron, J., dissent-
ing) ("I view this assumption of citizenship for a corporation as a mere evasion of the limits prescribed
to the United States courts by the Constitution.").
146. See Marshall v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 353 (1854) (Campbell, J., dissent-
ing).
The word "citizen," in American constitutions, state and federal, had a clear, distinct, and rec-
ognized meaning, understood by the common sense, and interpreted accordingly by this court
through a series of adjudications.
The court has contradicted that interpretation, and applied to it rules of construction
which will undermine every limitation in the Constitution, if universally adopted. A single in-
stance of the kind awakens apprehension, for it is regarded as a link in a chain of repetitions.
147. See id. at 325 (majority opinion).
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stated so explicitly, the faction's fears probably centered on free blacks'
ability to use similar reasoning to challenge the institution of slavery and its
related structure of racial subordination. Free black litigants could plausibly
argue that their recognition as citizens in some states secured them access
to the federal courts through diversity jurisdiction 48 and possibly to protec-
tion under the Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause. 149 Al-
though there is no smoking gun here, there is evidence that points in this
direction. To begin, this debate involved an area where the Court's latest
major statement on slavery, Strader v. Graham, probably did not apply, and
consequently, the Justices might find denying the Court's jurisdiction to be
difficult. 150
The Justices' understanding of citizenship law further complicated
matters, for it as yet offered no principled way to distinguish between cor-
porate and free black litigants. Both became citizens by recognition in a
particular state, 151 and possession of state citizenship granted federal citi-
zenship, 152 which brought various protections like that conferred by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Only at this point did corporations be-
come conceptually distinguishable. Corporations did not receive the benefit
of such constitutional provisions, but only because their charters, and not
their status as citizens, defined the scope of their rights. 153 Free blacks,
being natural persons, had no charters and therefore nothing, perhaps, stood
between them and a bundle of rights that the Justices believed to be rela-
tively sweeping. 154 The Supreme Court's aggressive application of the
148. Fehrenbacher criticized Taney for, among other things, not making this connection in Dred
Scott. See Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis, supra note 20, at 562.
149. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
151. Because states effectively recognized (or not) free blacks' citizenships, the bundle of rights
secured by citizenship varied starkly across jurisdictions and over time. See SMITH, supra note 36, at
255-58 (discussing state courts' efforts to reconcile free blacks' declining status within their under-
standing of citizenship law); Allen, Political Economy, supra note 37, at 250-51 (discussing the nature
of free black state citizenship); Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal
Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986) (arguing that recognition of free blacks'
rights in the North waxed, waned, and waxed again).
152. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 122-25 (discussing the widely held assumption across all three
branches of government concerning the primacy of state citizenship); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at
71 ("Although certain abolitionist theorists had developed a doctrine of paramount national citizenship,
the general tendency was to regard state citizenship as primary, with United States citizenship deriving
from it.").
153. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 131.
154. Antebellum interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause ranged widely. See Doug-
lass v. Stephens, I Del. Ch. 465 (1821) (presenting two starkly contrasting views of the Clause); Mi-
chael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after Death: The Privileges or Immunities
of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000) (discussing an even wider range of views
in extra-judicial debates). Taney Court Justices, not surprisingly, opted for an interpretation on the
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Obligations of Contracts Clause in cases of diverse citizenship only added
to their apprehension, and the actual appearance of litigants pursuing free-
dom claims in the same jurisdictional pathway' 55 certainly did not ease
their fears. The Southern faction therefore demanded that the Court bar all
"quasi-citizens"--persons, whether natural or artificial, that did not enjoy
"the same rights and faculties, and sustain the same obligations, political,
social, and moral" in common with other citizens' 56-from access to diver-
sity jurisdiction. And its members expressed their willingness to challenge
the very foundation of the Court's corporate law doctrine if their colleagues
failed to act.
C. The Emergence of Dred Scott
Dred Scott played out against the backdrop of these debates, and the
form the decision took--especially Chief Justice Taney's apparent ram-
blings157-- owed a great deal to its emergence at the intersection of the
Court's corporate and slave law doctrines. According to an agreed state-
narrow end of the spectrum developed by Justice Bushrod Washington, one of their Marshall Court
predecessors. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 119-21; see also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3,230). Although relatively narrow when placed alongside other views, Washington's
interpretation was still expansive:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We
feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are,
in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess prop-
erty of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right
of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas cor-
pus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or imposi-
tions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particu-
lar privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective fran-
chise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be
exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privi-
leges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other
state, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding
provision in the old articles of confederation) "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union."
Id. at 551-52 (quoting Articles of Confederation, art. IV (U.S. 1781)).
155. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 278-79 (discussing the possible implications for the Scott
family that might have followed from a pursuit of diversity jurisdiction).
156. Rundle v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 101 (1853) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
157. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 347; SMITH, supra note 36, at 268.
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ment of facts submitted by counsel, 158 Dr. John Emerson acquired Dred
Scott to accompany Emerson on his tour of duty as a military surgeon.
Between 1834 and 1838, Emerson and Scott resided in a post in Illinois and
then at Fort Snelling (in present day Minnesota), which fell in a portion of
the federal territory covered by the antislavery provision of the Missouri
Compromise. 159 While at Fort Snelling, Dred met and married his wife,
Harriet, and they produced two surviving children, one of whom was born
in free territory.160 In 1838, the Scott family returned to Missouri, and
shortly before the suit began, Emerson sold the Scott family to John F.A.
Sandford, a citizen of New York, against whom the family brought an ac-
tion for wrongful imprisonment. 161
Actually, the Scotts had been litigating for some time before Sandford
entered the picture. They had initially brought suit against Irene Emerson,
the late John Emerson's wife, in the 1840s, and they prevailed in the trial
court. 162 But the state supreme court, for reasons that are beyond the scope
of this paper, 163 reversed the ruling and issued a proslavery manifesto that
overturned thirty years worth of case law that strongly favored the freedom
claims of enslaved persons who had spent time in free territory. 164 At this
point, the Scott family, claiming citizenship in Missouri, took advantage of
their new owner's status as a citizen of New York and initiated a new case
in federal diversity jurisdiction. 165 The case then worked its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and as it did so, became freighted with political signifi-
cance, specifically because it involved the antislavery provision of the Mis-
souri Compromise. Dred Scott v. Sandford, in fact, provided the Taney
158. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 397-98 (1857). The statement was oversim-
plified. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 242-49 (providing a full account of Scott's travels);
VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 37, at 1040-59 (arguing that Harriet Scott's fact situation was
both different and stronger than the factual account in the case). For the sake of simplicity, the argument
in this Paper will adhere to the facts as stated in the case. But see ALLEN, supra note 8, at 141-43
(providing a fuller account of the facts of the case).
159. See DredScott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 397; Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548.
160. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 397-98.
161. Id. at 398.
162. See WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS: DRED SCOTT'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM
41-46 (1979) (providing the best account of the trial-level proceedings).
163. There is some disagreement as to why the Missouri Supreme Court acted the way it did.
Compare FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 262 (arguing that Dred Scott was a rejection of a liberal
policy toward slave transit), and FINKELMAN, supra note 19, at 217-28 (arguing that, until Dred Scott,
Missouri policy on slave transit favored liberty over slavery), with ALLEN, supra note 8, at 143-48
(arguing that Missouri's case law rested on certain expectations of behavior from post-emancipation
states).
164. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852).
165. See generally Walter Ehrlich, Was the Dred Scott Case Valid? 55 J. AM. HIST. 256 (1968)
(arguing that Sandford may not have owned Scott). But see FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 272-74
(arguing that Sandford probably did own the Scotts).
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Court with an opportunity to rule on Congress's power to limit the expan-
sion of slavery and to insert itself into the central political issue of the
1850s.
At first, the Justices resolved to evade the larger questions by using
Strader as justification for dismissing the case. The Court would argue that
questions concerning the Scotts' status properly belonged to the state
courts, which had already found them to be enslaved. 166 And here the case
would end, most likely, without controversy. That did not happen. Part of
the reason for this turn of events undoubtedly stemmed from the immense
political pressure the Justices felt to intervene. Some members had strong
personal feelings about the constitutionality of the Missouri Compro-
mise. 167 Congress, for years, had been writing legislation designed to get
the Court to settle the issue. 168 Members of the other branches pushed their
agendas privately as well. 169 Political explanations, however, do not tell the
whole story, for the Court also faced considerable internal stress from its
faction of Southern Justices who were deeply concerned about the appear-
ance of a case like Dred Scott. Such explanations also fail to account for
the vulnerable spot in which the Court found itself as a consequence of the
Scotts' litigation strategy.l 70
Counsel for the Scott family used tactics designed explicitly to evade
Strader, and they did so by suing in diversity and invoking Swift v. Ty-
son. 171 Missouri's ruling concerning the Scotts' status, they argued, "so far
from being conclusive.., is of no weight at all, beyond what is due to the
research, reason and authority which the opinion.., displays, or which
may be due to the character of the court which pronounces it."' 172 Their
strategy worked because Swift, in the years since its appearance, had si-
lently undermined the Court's ability to evade issues that emerged in diver-
sity jurisdiction. Since 1842, the Court had extended Swift enough to permit
the Justices to follow their own judgments in the construction of insurance
contracts, 173 wills, 174 and even state statutes. 175 All of the Justices, al-
166. Justice Samuel Nelson took this position in his concurring opinion in Dred Scott. See 60 U.S.
(19 How.) at 457-69 (Nelson, J., concurring).
167. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 185-86 (discussing Justices Daniel, McLean, and Campbell's
views on the Missouri Compromise).
168. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STuD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 45-50 (1993).
169. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 306-08.
170. See Dean, supra note 37.
171. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
172. Argument of Montgomery Blair, of counsel for Plaintiff in Error at 18, Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
173. See Carpenter v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 495 (1842).
174. See Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464 (1845).
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though not always agreeing on specifics, approved of this trend.176 In 1855,
even Justice Daniel invoked the Swift doctrine to ignore a state statute.177
Armed with this knowledge, Justice John McLean-who along with Justice
Benjamin R. Curtis, dissented in Dred Scott-dismissed the Court's strat-
egy to rely on Strader as nothing more than a policy choice that was out of
step with current Court rulings. 178 Justice McLean's colleagues also found
the strategy dissatisfying, and they opted for a broad ruling to be written by
Chief Justice Taney. That decision would make the Dred Scott case a syno-
nym for infamy.
The major components of the Chief Justice's ruling-the denial of
black federal citizenship and the striking down of the Missouri Compro-
mise's antislavery provision-have been well covered by scholars and need
not be discussed here in any great detail. 179 Yet the major features of those
components, like the pattern of events that led to the adoption of a broad
ruling, remain tightly linked to the larger structure of Taney Court jurispru-
dence and the internal debates it generated. Chief Justice Taney, for exam-
ple, wrote his citizenship ruling in a manner that responded to the Southern
faction's critique of corporate access to diversity jurisdiction. His solution,
in short, was the development of an explicitly anti-black vision of federal
citizenship. 180 The history of enslavement and subsequent oppression of
African Americans, he argued implicitly, made them categorically different
from other quasi-citizens and singled them out for restrictions (like the
denial of federal citizenship and access to diversity jurisdiction) that need
not apply to other quasi-citizens such as women, Native Americans, Mexi-
cans, and corporations. 181 His strategy worked; the Southern faction fell
apart in the terms immediately following Dred Scott. 1
82
Chief Justice Taney's handling of the territorial question also drew on
the larger structure of his Court's jurisprudence. Unlike most other situa-
175. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595 (1856).
176. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 155-57.
177. See Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (1856).
178. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 563-64 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting);
see also ALLEN, supra note 8, at 157-58 (discussing the significance of Justice McLean's argument).
179. See generally ALLEN, supra note 8, at 160-202; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 322-414.
180. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 161-69.
181. Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion explicitly exempted women, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at
422, and Native Americans, id. at 403-04. The Court had recognized former inhabitants of Mexico as
U.S. citizens in 1855. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525 (1855); cf Guadalupe T. Luna,
On the Complexities of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 691 (1999) (arguing that this recognition did not provide any tangible benefit). I have
made the case for Dred Scott's relevance to corporate law. See Allen, Political Economy, supra note 37
(making the case bluntly); ALLEN, supra note 8, at 107-32, 160-69, 208-10 (making a more nuanced
case).
182. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 208-10.
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tions involving significant constitutional provisions, the Court lacked a
sweeping Marshall Court statement on the meaning of the clause conferring
congressional power over the territories. 183 The Court, in fact, had little
case law at all on the subject, 184 and Chief Justice Taney developed a broad
ruling that sought to locate a place for the territories within the jurispruden-
tial framework developed by him and his colleagues. 185 That framework, of
course, envisioned a federal government with strictly limited powers that
curbed the amount of discretion it possessed when legislating for the terri-
tories (among other matters).186 Those limits barred Congress from prohib-
iting slavery in the territories. 187 Chief Justice Taney's intervention into the
territorial question generated a great deal of scorn from critics. 188 In hind-
sight, a narrow ruling may have been a more appropriate response to the
Dred Scott case. Taney Court Justices did not have the advantage of hind-
sight, but they did have a coherent understanding of their Court's authority
and its appropriate uses (at least on a technical level). They also had a case
before them in a jurisdictional area that both gave them considerable flexi-
bility and rendered difficult any effort to evade the decision. They were
also a Court that had become bitterly divided over the question of quasi-
citizens' access to diversity jurisdiction, and the case before them offered
the Justices a way to break the impasse. Moreover, they faced some politi-
cal pressure. In short, a case like Dred Scott was probably unavoidable.
183. American Insurance Co. v. Canter does not count as a major Marshall Court statement on the
meaning of the Constitution's Needful Rules Clause. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States .. "); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,
546 (1828) ("In legislating, for [the territories], Congress exercises the combined powers of the general,
and of a state government."). In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney construed Canter narrowly, arguing
that the Clause applied only to the organization of territorial courts (the specific issue that Marshall was
addressing). Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 444-46. Justice McLean contended that Marshall recog-
nized a general grant of authority over the territories. Id. at 541 (McLean, J., dissenting). Fehrenbacher
concurred with this position. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 8, at 373. I have argued that Marshall's
opinion was too ambiguous to sustain either argument. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 198. Marshall's state-
ment on the Needful Rules Clause stands in stark contrast to his statements on other clauses found in
the document. Compare Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, with, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824) (construing the Commerce Clause), and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (con-
struing the Obligations of Contract Clause).
184. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 182-86.
185. Id. at 186-94.
186. See id. at 21-30 (discussing the Taney Court's understanding of federal power).
187. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450.




III. DRED SCOTT AND JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY
The argument that Dred Scott was unavoidable raises significant is-
sues. Much of contemporary constitutional theory asserts that the adoption
of a proper interpretive stance would eliminate the appearance of future
Dred Scotts.189 Although few theorists would admit that their position
could lead to such a decision,190 Mark Graber has argued persuasively that
every major school of constitutional theory could in fact do so. 191 The cer-
tainty that there will be other cases like Dred Scott requires a consideration
of how to respond to them. 192 This matter demands confronting whether the
Supreme Court is the final authority on constitutional interpretation or
whether the other branches have a say on the Constitution's meaning.
Debates over the merits of judicial sovereignty and departmentalism
(as the two positions are currently termed) go back to the immediate after-
math of Dred Scott. State courts in Ohio 193 and Maine 194 debated whether
the decision bound them. Members of both courts reached different conclu-
sions. 195 In their famous contest for a seat in the U.S. Senate, Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen Douglas struggled with the issue. 196 The debate con-
189. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 1019 (arguing that one must "explain why Dred
Scott... is bad constitutional law ... or she is out of the game"); Mark A. Graber, Desperately Duck-
ing Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 272
(1997) (arguing that "[v]irtually every commentator who condemns Dred Scott insists that Taney could
not have reached that decision's proslavery and racist conclusions had he understood or adhered to the
correct theory of the judicial function in constitutional cases").
190. Cf. I ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 79 (arguing, and finding "sobering," that his theory of
dualist democracy might indeed lead to a case like Dred Scott).
191. Graber, supra note 189, at 273 (arguing that "Dred Scott is constitutionally plausible in any
contemporary constitutional rhetoric").
192. One may say "certainty" because Dred Scott is merely the first (and one of the most promi-
nent) in a line of cases considered wrongly decided and oppressive. There have been enough, according
to J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, to make up an anti-canon of constitutional law. Balkin & Levin-
son, supra note 9, at 1018-19. Uncontroversial examples on the list would include, in addition to Dred
Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, Buck v. Bell, and Korematsu v. United States. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the removal and internment of Japanese
Americans during the Second World War); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the forced
sterilization of persons with mental disabilities); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling that
maximum-hours legislation violated the right of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding interstate travel for racially segregated railway
cars).
193. Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856).
194. Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 44 Me. 505 (1857).
195. In Ohio, a majority of the Court believed that, at least on the issue of slave transit, Dred Scott
did not bind them. See Anderson, 6 Ohio St. at 631-32. Chief Justice Bartley disagreed, arguing that the
decision bound them as much as did the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on the state's banking laws. Id. at
722-24 (Bartley, C.J.); see also Opinion, 44 Me. at 550, 591 (showing two contrasting views on the
issue).
196. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM
1829-1861, at 201-09 (2005) (providing a recent overview of the issue).
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tinues to this day. Some scholars contend that cases like Dred Scott should
not be followed; 197 others maintain that such decisions, however opprobri-
ous, must be followed, although the other branches should work to overturn
them. 198 A few contend that legal theorists would do better to dismiss Dred
Scott as an aberration and embrace judicial supremacy. 199 Whatever merits
it may have, such an argument does little to address the significant con-
cerns raised by an unchecked judiciary. Dred Scott, in fact, underscores the
need for a departmental constitutionalism because the Supreme Court, or at
least the Taney Court, becomes too mired in short-sighted, internal debates
to claim status as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning. "If war is too
serious to be entrusted to the military," William Wiecek wrote, "at times
the American constitution is too serious to be relinquished to the
judges." 200
Fehrenbacher thus correctly emphasized the problem of judicial sov-
ereignty, but his account, because it focused so exclusively on the Court's
role as a political actor, left significant issues unresolved. Consequently,
constitutional theorists influenced by Fehrenbacher's interpretation have
not fully addressed the problem Dred Scott presents. In an argument advo-
cating a minimalist approach to constitutional interpretation, for example,
Cass R. Sunstein contends that a case like Dred Scott presented a classic
example of a situation appropriate for a narrow ruling. The issues involved
sat at the core of a raging democratic debate, and there was a strong possi-
bility that the Court could decide incorrectly and make mistakes that would
be difficult to remedy. 20 1 Instead, of course, "the Court decided every issue
that it was possible to decide"202 and proved Sunstein's point "that judicial
efforts to resolve large questions of political morality may well be fu-
tile."' 203 Sunstein is probably correct on the larger point, but from the per-
spective of this Paper, avoiding a maximal ruling may not have been
possible. Dred Scott emerged in the context of long-running internal de-
bates that both made the formulation of a narrow ruling exceedingly diffi-
cult and raised issues among the Justices that required sweeping rulings for
197. See, e.g., Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 99 (referring to Dred Scott as "a heinous decision
that demands disobedience").
198. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 1421, 1433 n.54 (1999) (arguing that other branches may refuse to follow only cases that
clearly and egregiously violate the Constitution and that Dred Scott did not meet that standard).
199. Alexander & Shauer, supra note 16, at 1382-83 (discussing Dred Scott as a counter example
to their argument that the American legal system needs an authoritative interpreter to settle disputes).
200. Wiecek, supra note 18, at 59.
201. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 32.




resolution. Those issues arose from the unintended consequences of previ-
ous rulings. Thus, the Ohio banking cases that shaped the course of Dred
Scott developed as a response to the Court's effort to scale back the scope
of rulings handed down by the Marshall Court.204 Supreme Court Justices
may well be always/already trapped by the constraints of their jurispru-
dence, and broad rulings dealing with questions of morality are probably
inevitable, whatever the consequences for everybody else.
Another approach to the problem of judicial sovereignty argues that
the Court should admit that it is not the final arbiter of constitutional mean-
ing and recognize that the other branches of government have a wide range
of interpretive discretion on constitutional questions.205 Both Larry D.
Kramer and G. Edward White demonstrate that the Taney Court recognized
such discretion. 20 6 Its members saw a sharp distinction between political
questions and legal ones,207 and they managed to strike a balance between
judicial supremacy and departmental discretion.208 White and Kramer both
conclude that Dred Scott breached this understanding of the Court's own
authority, 209 although the latter, noting Lincoln's relatively guarded cri-
tique of judicial supremacy,210 seems a bit less sure than the former.
211
Kramer's uncertainty is justified, for Dred Scott in fact fell on the Court's
side of its understanding of the distinction between law and politics.
For the Taney Court, the test determining whether a particular ques-
tion was "political" did not center on whether the issue involved was con-
troversial and the subject of democratic debate. Rather, the matter turned
on whether the question embraced the discretionary use of constitutionally
recognized power by other departments of the government. Luther v. Bor-
den212 provided a classic example. Litigants in that case asked the Court to
choose which of two competing Rhode Island constitutions was legitimate.
The Court refused, arguing that the selection of a constitution, which would
effectively define what rights state citizens would enjoy, involved discre-
204. See supra text accompanying notes 117-55.
205. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and
Political Questions, 63 J. POL. 365 (2001).
206. Kramer, supra note 32, at 114-17; White, supra note 32, at 1491-1506.
207. See Kramer, supra note 32, at 114-15 (discussing Justice Story's expansive version of the
political question doctrine); see also ALLEN, supra note 8, at 15-21 (discussing the Taney Court's
expansive version of the political question doctrine).
208. See White, supra note 32, at 1491-1506.
209. Kramer, supra note 32, at 116; White, supra note 32, at 1509.
210. "Though controversial at the time, Lincoln's critique of judicial supremacy was actually quite
guarded, as he hedged his departmentalism in various ways and on all sides." Kramer, supra note 32, at
116.
211. Seeid.atll6-17.
212. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tionary issues into which the federal courts could not inquire. 213 Likewise,
when Taney served Andrew Jackson as Attorney General, he made the case
for the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States. Con-
gress's power to tax necessarily implied full discretion over the creation of
fiscal agents required to exercise its power. If it decided to create an op-
pressive banking institution endowed with enough money and power to
destroy the Union, Congress could do so, and the federal courts could not
stop it.214 In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney recognized that Congress
possessed wide discretion over the creation of territorial governments, but
he argued that this discretion did not permit Congress to violate the strict
exceptions to power contained in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
215
Whether Chief Justice Taney made the right call on the constitutionality of
the legislation before him is a separate issue, but potential breaches of con-
stitutionally circumscribed limits represented precisely the sort of matters
into which the Court believed it could inquire.
The utility of Dred Scott for contemporary constitutional theorists may
not be that it serves as a reminder to interpret minimally or to maintain a
sharp distinction between law and politics. It may simply remind us not to
expect too much from courts. Dred Scott represents merely one significant
example in an ever growing string of cases where the Court demonstrated
that it will neither avoid questions it is probably not suited to answer nor
provide interpretive room for the other branches of government.
216
The inability to fully repudiate Dred Scott provides further justifica-
tion for low expectations. Contemporary constitutional scholars ritually
repeat Dred Scott's status as dead law. 217 Judges first declared the decision
213. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 20.
214. Id. at 18-19; see also Letter from Roger B. Taney to State Department at 1-2 (June 9, 1832)
(on file with the National Archives and Records Administration (miscellaneous letters, record group
59)).
215. ALLEN, supra note 8, at 190-91.
216. See Kramer, supra note 32; cases discussed supra note 192. Bush v. Gore, which reversed an
order of the Florida Supreme Court to recount manually votes cast in certain counties during the 2000
Election, provides a recent example. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). There is currently a debate concerning
whether Bush will be as damaging to the Court's legitimacy as was Dred Scott. Compare Aviam Soifer,
Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REv. 699 (2002) (arguing yes), with Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and
the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407 (2001) (arguing, in the long run, no; in
the short run, maybe), and Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional
History, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721 (2001) (arguing probably not), and John C. Yoo, In Defense of the
Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 780 (2001) (arguing no).
217. See e.g., I ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 65 ("[A]bsolutely nothing of present legal significance
hangs on whether Chief Justice Taney was right about the status of blacks in 1857."); Balkin & Levin-




to be defunct in the 1860s, 2 18 and since the 1870s the statement that the
Fourteenth Amendment overturned Dred Scott has remained a standard
refrain in constitutional law. 219 That statement, however, only applies to
the citizenship ruling. As one federal judge wrote in 1900, "While the deci-
sion ... relative to the status of the negro race has been the subject of much
criticism, no one has ever questioned that part of the decision which relates
to the status of acquired territory. '220 A year later, the U.S. Supreme Court
matter-of-factly invoked Dred Scott, arguing that the decision recognized
in Congress a general power of legislation over territories acquired by the
United States.221 "Surely the law is passionless," wrote one commentator as
he praised the Court.222 "[T]he Dred Scott case was sound in principle.
When the tumult of anger and outrage, engendered by the slavery question
had passed away, and judges were confronted with the principles an-
nounced by that decision, they did not disregard it.'"223 Nor have judges
disregarded it in more recent cases dealing with territories, 224 on questions
of diversity jurisdiction,225 or in discussions of the duality of American
citizenship. 2
26
Lately, judges have cited Dred Scott in debates over the meaning of
the Second Amendment. 227 In his discussion of the Privileges and Immuni-
218. See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 790 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) (asserting
that Dred Scott decided only "that Scott was a slave"); Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 304 (1866) (argu-
ing that Dred Scott "is now disregarded by every department of the government").
219. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 875 (1985);
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873); Zappa v. Cruz, 30 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128
(D.P.R. 1998); People ex rel. Hedgman v. Bd. of Registration, 26 Mich. 51, 53 (1872); State v.
Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 663 (R.I. 2004); State v. Strauder, 11 W. Va. 745, 803 (1877).
220. Exparte Ortiz, 100 F. 955, 960 (C.C.D. Minn. 1900) (overstating the case, to be sure).
221. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196-97 (1901); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
274-75 (1901) (arguing that Dred Scott did not extend the entire Constitution to the territories, but only
particular provisions related to the protection of slavery).
222. Morris M. Cohn, The Dred Scott Case in the Light of Later Events, 46 AM. L. REV. 548, 556
(1912).
223. Id.
224. See Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 43
n.34 (lst Cir. 1981); Nevada ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 171 (D.
Nev. 1981).
225. See, e.g., Imperial Ref. Co. v. Wyman, 38 F. 574, 576-78 (C.C.D. Ohio 1889); Paglin v.
Saztec Int'l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (W.D. Mo. 1993); Tip-Pa-Hans Enters., Inc. v. Atco Elec.
Co. (In re Tip-Pa-Hans Enters., Inc.), 27 B.R. 780, 783 (W.D. Va. 1983); Council of Sch. Officers v.
Vaughn, 553 A.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. 1989).
226. See Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983); State ex rel.
Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 241-42 (1946).
227. "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. i; see also Akhil Reed Amar,




ties Clause,228 Taney argued that its language could not apply to free
blacks, because if it did, then they would be, among other things, entitled
"to keep and carry arms wherever they went. ' 229 Opponents of gun control
cite this passage as evidence of the Founders' recognition of an individual
right to bear arms. 230 In 2005, the Second Circuit confronted the issue and
remained unconvinced, 231 and Oregon's Supreme Court cited the same
passage in a decision holding that barring criminals' possession of firearms
did not violate the right to bear arms secured in the state's constitution. 232
On the other side, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit a few years ago
chided his colleagues for failing to oppose what he considered to be op-
pressive antigun laws:
As Chief Justice Taney well appreciated, the institution of slavery re-
quired a class of people who lacked the means to resist. A revolt by Nat
Turner and a few dozen other armed blacks could be put down without
much difficulty; one by four million armed blacks would have meant big
trouble.233
The persistence of Dred Scott as authority, despite its being regularly as-
sailed by both judges and legal academics, 234 is striking. One wonders what
lines of doctrine would have developed in the absence of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Dred Scott's staying power together with the appearance of additional
rulings, such as Plessy v. Ferguson,235 Lochner v. New York,236 Buck v.
228. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
229. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
230. See Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Sanford Levinson, The Em-
barrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 651 (1989)) (summarizing the anti-gun control
position's use of Dred Scott).
231. "This is not the occasion to weigh the import, if any, of Chief Justice Taney's ruminations.
Because we agree with defendants and the district court that New York's licensing scheme is suffi-
ciently justified, we will assume, without deciding, that entitlement to a New York carry license is a
privilege under Article IV." Id. at 91 (citations omitted).
232. State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1126 n.39 (Or. 2005). See generally OR. CONST. art. I, § 27.
233. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
234. See, e.g., Exparte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542, 548-49 (Ala. 2001) (Moore, C.J., concurring
specially) ("This ruling [Dred Scott] was patently incorrect, and many citizens of this Country still
suffer the legacy of such a poorly reasoned United States Supreme Court opinion."); Lambert v. State,
984 P.2d 221, 247 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (Lumpkin, J.) (arguing that cases like Dred Scott "result[]
in not only turmoil, but a denigration of the respect of the judicial system and the rule of law"); I
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 63 (calling Dred Scott "[firom a moral point of view,... the single dark-
est stain upon the Court's checkered history"); BORK, supra note 3, at 28 (arguing that Dred Scott
"remained unchallenged as the worst in our history until the twentieth century ...."); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term-Forward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 62 (2000) (referring to Dred Scott as "an outlandish reading" of the Constitution); Friedman, supra
note 39, at 415 (calling Dred Scott "the most repugnant and reviled of Supreme Court decisions");
GRABER, supra note 14, at 15-17 (providing further examples).
235. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
236. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Bell, 237 or Korematsu v. United States, 238 in what Balkin and Levinson
have termed the anti-canon of constitutional law, 239 underscores Wiecek's
point that the Constitution ought not to be left to judges.240 Successful con-
stitutional governance demands extrajudicial interpretation, and other
branches must assert themselves against the Court's claims of supremacy.
Andrew Jackson and future Chief Justice Taney engaged in precisely this
behavior when they and their allies destroyed the Second Bank of the
United States, 241 whose existence the Court had defended in a classic
statement of judicial supremacy. 242 Abraham Lincoln, along with the Re-
publican Party, participated in a similar process when they reacted against
Dred Scott. Although he admitted the decision bound the parties, Lincoln
never conceded that it bound the government, and he pledged that Republi-
cans would work to overturn the decision.24 3 And they did. In 1866, an
Indiana judge reported that every branch of government had repudiated
Dred Scott:2
44
Passports are granted to free men of color, of African descent, by the ex-
ecutive department. Congress, by its legislation, declares such persons
citizens of the United States, and passes laws for their protection as such.
The Supreme Court, in the face of its own decision, admits to its bar, as
attorneys and counsellors at law, persons of African descent.
245
The Republicans' response to Dred Scott illustrates the value of de-
partmental constitutionalism. Courts will do what courts do: settle disputes
among litigants, deal with the unintended consequences that arise from that
dispute resolution, make the occasional disastrous mistake, and intervene in
issues that they probably should leave alone. This was the process that
produced Dred Scott. If the Court was the final arbiter of constitutional
meaning, a case like Dred Scott could very well have the effect of shutting
down democratic debate and rendering future criticism of settled issues
somewhat illegitimate. But the Taney Court's infamous 1857 ruling did not
have that effect at all. Instead, it intensified a debate about the vision of
237. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
238. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
239. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 9, at 1018-19.
240. Wiecek, supra note 18, at 59.
241. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 15,220.
242. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Second Bank of the United States).
243. See ALLEN, supra note 8, at 220 (arguing that Taney and Lincoln used similar forms of extra-
judicial tactics); Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Sixth Joint Debate with Stephen Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858),
in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 245, 255 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965); Kramer,
supra note 32, at 116-17 (discussing Lincoln's critique of judicial supremacy).




governance that lay beneath the decision. As Bruce Ackerman has written,
Dred Scott forced Americans to confront a serious question: "Was the
Jacksonian vision of decentralized slaveholding democracy good
enough?" 246 By the 1860s, the answer was clearly no, and it was the peo-
ple, not the courts, who provided that answer.
246. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 79.
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